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ABSTRACT 
 
Since uncertainty and irreversibility are inherent, environmental policy involves the 
problems of timing of implementation. Environmental policy based on cost-benefit 
analysis using certainty equivalent presents values can be misleading under the combined 
effect of irreversibility and uncertainty.  
 
Using real options method, the thesis analyzes the timing of early action investment in 
Canada’s Kyoto commitment. Early action investment in emission reductions is 
irreversible. The thesis uses a simple two-period model, and then lays out a 
corresponding continuous-time model to show that under technological uncertainty, early 
action investment should be delayed until more information - the results of R&D - is 
revealed. In particular, the more uncertain the outcome of research, the more the firm 
should delay early action investment. 
 
The thesis argues that Canada’s Kyoto commitment is well intentioned but not wisely 
implemented: early action investment on emission reductions may not be efficient. The 
results suggest that a more gradual Kyoto program would be favourable.  
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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION  
 
Many scientists believe that part of the earth’s atmosphere is acting as an insulation traps 
sufficient infrared radiation to keep the global average temperature in a comfortable 
range. The insulation is the collection of the six atmospheric gases called “greenhouse 
gases” (GHGs), which consist of carbon dioxide, methane, nitrous oxide, and fluorinated 
gases (hydro fluorocarbons, per fluorocarbons and sulphur hexafluoride). 
 
Rising concentration of GHG emissions has been detected, and serious negative 
consequences have been predicted. Over the past several decades, increasing GHG 
emissions are direct results of human activities, and are called the enhanced greenhouse 
effect. The enhanced greenhouse effect will increase the average temperature of the 
Earth’s surface gradually (also known as the global warming effect), and will possibly 
change the global heating and cooling system. For instance (e.g., see Titenberg, 1996), 
the increasing concentration of the GHG will possibly increase the temperature of the 
earth surface to its highest in thousands of years. The consequence is to raise the sea level 
and affect the agricultural sites, increasing areas of deserts, and trigger a diminished 
capacity to raise food. 
 
1.1 Kyoto Protocol and Canada  
Increasing human interference in the ecological system will bring economic and 
institutional difficulties. The GHG emissions not only will impose environmental 
damages on the current public, but also will jeopardize sustainable development in the 
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sense that the next generation will be enjoying fewer natural resources than they would 
have been. GHG emissions lead to externality. Air is a public good. It is jointly 
consumed by everyone on the planet and it is unlikely to prevent one from consuming it. 
There will be market failure in the sense that the scarcity of the clean air can not be 
reflected by the market price and the marginal condition for optimal resource allocation 
cannot be met. There is no incentive for individual economic agents, acting alone, to 
reduce their emissions.  
 
Generally, economists would suggest two categories of policy instruments to correct the 
failure and to solve the difficulty: an emission trading system and a tax system. For the 
emission-trading program, the simplest form is that the government issues emission 
permits for the target level of aggregate emissions. These permits can be “auctioned”, or 
“grandfathered” on the historical emission basis. The chosen method of initial allocation 
reflects an implicit assignment of the property rights: grandfathering assigns property 
rights to incumbent polluters; auctioning assigns property rights to the state, and reflects 
the same “polluter pays principle” embodied in the emission charges. The key to the 
emission-trading program is that the allocated permits can be traded in an emissions 
permit market. If the market is “competitive” such that all agents are price-takers, then 
the marginal abatement cost will be equal to the permit price for all firms. 
 
With emission trading, new international agreements have very large latitude in 
establishing emission targets and feasible policies. A significant step in this direction is 
the Kyoto protocol. The Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on 
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Climate Change (UNFCCC) was formally adopted by the third session of the Conference 
of the Parties (COP 3) on 11 December 1997 in Kyoto, Japan. According to the Climate 
Change Secretariat (2002), the Protocol consists of the five main elements. The first two 
focus on implementation of costs for developed countries, such as Canada.  
 
The first element of the Protocol, “commitment”, establishes a general legally binding 
obligation on the industrialized countries (list in Annex I) to reduce emissions for GHG 
emissions by approximately 5 percent below their 1990 levels in total by the period of 
2008-2012. The Annex I countries shall achieve their emissions targets in the (first) 
commitment period of 2008-2012 and be allowed to emit the assigned amount that was 
formally established on the baseline of 1990 levels.  
 
The second element of the Protocol is implementation of a significant domestic policy 
and its measures to achieve emissions target, and supplemented with carbon sinks and 
market-based mechanisms by Annex I countries. Carbon sinks are the carbon dioxide 
removed concurrently by the forest and by other ecosystems that will generate removal 
units to offset emissions. The market-based mechanisms, also known as Kyoto 
mechanisms, consist of the joint implementation (JI), the clean developed mechanisms 
(CDM) and the emission trading (ET). The JI will allow Annex I countries to generate 
emission reduction units against its own commitments by sponsoring emission reduction 
of carbon sinks projects in other Annex I countries. The CDM allows Annex I countries 
to earn certified emission reductions by investing in the emission reductions, or sinks 
projects in the non-Annex I countries. The certified emission reductions generated 
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between 2000 and 2008 can be credited against their commitments under the 
commitment period, which is called the “early crediting”. Banking will be allowed in 
both JI and CDM. The ET allows Annex I countries to acquire the assigned amount of 
units, removable units, emission reduction units and certified emission reductions from 
other Annex I countries.  
 
Canada, as a signatory to the Kyoto Protocol, has committed to reduce GHG emission to 
6 percent below its 1990 levels in the first commitment period between 2008 and 2012. 
This is equivalent to a reduction of 240 Megatons (MT) of the projected business as usual 
(BAU) emission levels. The Government of Canada (2002) has established some plans to 
achieve its commitment in three steps. These steps are stated as follows: 
1. The action underway is that the emission reductions will be 80 MT, among which 
50 MT emission reductions will be bequeathed from Action Plan 2000 and 
Budget 2001. The Plan and the Budget create market and financial incentives to 
support the investment in the creation of renewable energies, such as wind power 
production and hydroelectric production. Investment in transportation and 
industry sectors is substantial for the emission reductions. Large investments have 
been made not only to the process innovations, but also to product innovation. For 
instance, Motor Vehicle Fuel Efficiency Initiative proposes to improve 25% new 
vehicle fleet fuel efficiency by 2010. The Future Fuel Initiative will develop and 
demonstrate biofuel technologies and infrastructure for commercializing the fuel 
cell vehicles.  
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2. In the first commitment period, new actions are expected to count for 100 MT.  
 
3. The remaining 60 MT gap will be covered by the current or potential reductions, 
made possible by Partnership Fund and existing research & development (R&D) 
investments directed at climate change issue. 
 
In sum, Canada plans to reduce emissions as much as 240 MT to meet its commitment. 
Early action investment in improving energy sufficiency and conducting new technology 
will generate emission reductions by about 130 MT, which is more than half of the 
commitment. Emission reduction actions and international emission trading are expected 
to reduce 76-86 MT. Carbon sinks are expected to count for about 30 MT of GHG 
emissions.  
 
1.2 The Role of Uncertainty  
Many questions arise about the feasibility of the Kyoto. Some opposition leaders in the 
Canadian government and some Canadian firms are still reluctant to implement the 
Kyoto Protocol. For example, the firms that heavily depending on fossil fuel in Alberta 
have opposed the Kyoto. This opposition to the Kyoto clearly indicates that there must be 
some fundamental problems in the Kyoto that have not yet been solved. 
 
One of the reasons is that the Kyoto protocol is an international convention. Since 
emission reduction is international public goods, it is available to everyone on the planet. 
The countries that free ride on emission reductions from other countries will jeopardise 
 6 
the international treaty. It will also present enforcement problems from the practical point 
of view. Self-monitoring by an individual country is the only practical solution because 
its government is unlikely to permit international monitoring methods to penalize the 
countries that exceed their emission quota. In other words, the only enforcement tool that 
is available is moral obligation or trade sanction. 
 
The relation between a government and a firm is the “principle and agent” relation. As a 
regulator, the government will seek job security, size of the bureaucracy and emission 
reductions as its political assets, in order to win elections or extract tangible rents for 
themselves. The firms will seek a minimum abatement cost in the case of emission 
reductions. The government can create incentives for the firms to reduce emissions, by 
three typical instruments: fees, market permits, or liability. A cost-effective policy relied 
on cost-benefit analysis will set the fee level, or permit price, equal to the marginal 
abatement cost that is equalized across the firms.  
 
However, the traditional cost-benefit analysis in the context of the Kyoto protocol does 
not include the impact of uncertainty. On the one hand, as the literature suggests (e.g., see 
Baranzini, Chesney and Morisset, 2003), the cost-benefit analysis omits the uncertainty 
surrounding costs and benefits of controlling global warming, and does not consider the 
possibility of waiting for more information. Early action investment will have irreversible 
consequences, which may have an option value under uncertainty, in the sense that 
waiting for information may reduce the total abatement cost over time. Considering this 
option value, rational firms will have strong incentive to delay early action, which 
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explains why the firms oppose the Kyoto. On the other hand, the uncertainty leads to the 
principle-agent problem: due to lack of future information, the government may induce 
more early action investment (or abatements) than what the firms will be willing to 
undertake (or abate). Thus, the Kyoto target would be much higher than its optimal level, 
and the Kyoto policy will not be efficiently implemented. 
 
The uncertainty problem requires governments to explicitly deal with global warming in 
a sustainable way. One important characteristics of a permit system is that, if enforced, 
the permit system will guarantee the Kyoto commitment regardless the costs. Facing 
uncertainty, the governments will set the Kyoto target according to the current 
information and the cost-benefit analysis. Although the permit system will guarantee to 
meet the Kyoto target, the true levels of emission reduction will be much less than the 
ones the governments initially thought. As a result, the Kyoto policy will induce a social 
loss. If the relative slope of marginal damage curve is higher than the slope of marginal 
cost curve, the social loss will be higher (see Weitzman, 1974). The governments will 
notice the option value of waiting for more information, thus, will have incentive to wait. 
This explains why some parties in the Government of Canada oppose the Kyoto. 
 
Using real options, the goal of this thesis is to analyze the timing of implementation of 
early action investment in the Kyoto Protocol under uncertainty. The irreversibility 
considered here is associated with the investments made to control emissions. The thesis 
will implicitly model the technological uncertainty, and demonstrate a flexible early 
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action investment rule for the firms that are facing different levels or magnitude of 
uncertainty.  
 
1.3 Thesis Organization  
The thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 will analyze a two-period model, which was 
developed by Kennedy (2002), and introduce the impact of irreversibility under 
uncertainty, which is intrinsic to early action investment. Kennedy (2002) concluded that 
research and planning, which will reveal the viability of prospective technological 
improvements, is less costly than early action investment in emission reductions. 
Although his model is implicitly predicated the role of research and development and the 
new information it would reveal, Kennedy (2002) does not explicitly model the 
underlying uncertainty which will affect early action investment. Chapter 3 is designed to 
parameterize the implementation of Chapter 2. Two experiments, the increasing risk and 
the “bad news principle”, will be conducted against a numerical benchmark. These 
experiments will answer the question of how different level and magnitude of uncertainty 
will affect investment decisions in the Kyoto protocol. A more rigorous analysis will be 
developed in Chapter 4, where the real options approach will be used to solve the 
problem with a continuous-time model. Conclusions will be drawn in Chapter 5. 
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CHAPTER 2 TWO-PERIOD MODEL 
 
The investment role in the Kyoto is substantial. More than half of the commitment will 
be reduced using investment on energy efficiency and new technology. In evaluating this 
investment, firms must pay special attention to decide which information is relevant to 
the decision at hand and which information is not. Thus, it is important to address: 
• What the characteristics of investment are, 
• With these characteristics, how uncertainty will affect investment decisions. 
 
This chapter is devoted to these questions. In the first section, some general assumption 
will be made. In the second section a two-period model which draws on Kennedy (2002) 
will be introduced. An investment model of cost minimization will be developed. Finally, 
the role of uncertainty will be demonstrated qualitatively, and the questions above will be 
answered. 
 
2.1 The Model 
2.1.1 General Assumption  
For simplicity, this thesis will concentrate on one representative firm. This firm will be 
risk neutral and will compete in competitive input and output markets. The general 
assumption under a deterministic setting is that the firm has a perfect foresight of the 
future. This will ensure the firm to behave according to intrinsic logic rather than ad hoc 
assumptions, or the rules of thumb. In a stochastic setting, it is assumed that the firm has 
rational expectations. Thus, facing future contingency, the firm will continuously adjust 
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its investment plans grounded in the new information as the information is scarce and no 
information should be wasted. The investment plans may be erroneous and suffer from 
continuously favourable or unfavourable shocks, however, the rational forecast will be 
unbiased. The probability distribution of the estimated future total abatement cost will 
concentrate around the true value of the abatement cost, which is unknown. As a result, 
the firm’s optimization problem can be simplified as optimizing the expected total 
abatement cost. 
 
2.1.2 Investment and Emission Reductions 
The technological abatements will yield some different time profiles of emission 
reductions due to investment lags and learning effect. This diversity will be modeled into 
two stylized types: research and planning investment and capital investment. 
Technological changes will have had different effects on the technological abatement, 
and those effects will have occurred with different lags. The research and planning 
investment are the investment in knowledge creation. The accumulation of knowledge 
usually takes time, and thus the research and planning investment will yield some 
emission reductions by its cumulative level. The capital investment refers to the money 
paid to purchase the capital assets or fixed assets such as equipments or machineries, 
updating maintenance, building wind or hydroelectric station. The capital investment will 
yield emission reductions concurrently. The past capital investment also yield emission 
reductions due to the learning effect. 
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Following Kennedy (2002), let x denote the research and planning investment and y 
denote the capital investment. Denote r  as the technological abatement. The 
technological abatement for early action period (2003-2008) and the first commitment 
period (2008-2012) are 
2/1
1111 yr θ= ,          (2.1) 
2/1
121
2/1
222
2/1
1212 xyyr αθθ ++= ,       (2.2) 
where ijθ  is the positive parameter for emission reductions in i th period by capital 
investment jy  and 21α  is the emission reduction parameter of research and planning 
investment 1x  in the first commitment period. The positive parameters ijθ  and 21α  are 
the shift parameters that parameterize the effectiveness of the investments; they 
determine the marginal technological abatement of capital on emission reductions 
partially. For any given amount of investment, the greater the parameter ( ijθ  or 21α ), the 
more emission reductions will be generated than otherwise. For example if 1121 θθ > , 
where 11θ  is the shift parameter of investment and 21θ  is the shift parameter of 
cumulative investment, a given amount of cumulative capital investment will yield more 
emission reductions than new capital investment will. This can be explained as learning 
effect associated with new technology because the cumulative capital investment yields 
more emission reductions without new economic resources engaged in knowledge 
creation. The investments on the right of Equation (2.1) and (2.2) are all in square root 
form, which models technological abatement function with diminishing returns. 
Replicating the input in the Kyoto might not double the emission reductions. In the case 
of knowledge creation, replicating the research and planning investment without research 
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interaction will cause the same set of discoveries happens twice. The capital investment 
is assumed to follow the conventional economy; it is diminishing returns. Finally, an 
equality of the equation simply indicates that the technological abatement is the total 
emission reductions with capital investment, cumulative research and planning 
investment, and cumulative capital investment.  
 
2.1.3 Control Cost  
The cost functions are assumed quadratic in abatement actions. A large deviation from 
the origin will induce a high penalty cost, while a smaller deviation will induce a lower 
penalty cost. Recall that there are two stages: stage one (the early action period) is from 
2002 to 2008 and stage two (the first commitment period) is from 2008 to 2012. The cost 
function in the early action period can be described as 
( ) 11211111111  ,, epzyxeyxcc +++== γ ,      (2.3) 
where γ is a positive parameter, 1z  is behavioural abatement, 1p  is permit price, and 1e  is 
the actual emissions in stage one. The model assumes that the purchase price of capital is 
embedded in the cost function, and is fixed at one. The behavioural abatement cost 21γz  is 
in quadratic form in order to emphasize a higher impact of this cost to the total cost. 
There will be no incentive to undertake behavioural abatement in stage one if there is any 
charge for emissions ( 0 1 =pif ). In the first commitment period (stage two), the cost 
function is arranged as  
( ) 2222222222  ;, epzypeycc ++== γ .      (2.4) 
 
Denote b as emissions under BAU levels. By definition, 
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)( zrbe +−= ,         (2.5) 
such that the quantity of total abatement will cover the gap between emissions under 
BAU levels and actual emissions. Substitute Equation (2.1) and (2.2) into (2.3) and (2.4) 
respectively to obtain 
( ) ( ) 1121111111111 ,, eperbyxeyxcc +−−++== γ ,     (2.6) 
( ) ( ) 22222222222 , eperbyeycc +−−+== γ  .     (2.7) 
 
The firm will make decisions sequentially. In this model, the fist commitment period will 
be the terminal stage, at which the stage one action will have become history to the firm. 
At this stage, the firm’s problem will be to minimize its cost by choosing the optimal 
amount of investment and emissions, given the early action in stage one. The 
technological abatement in stage two is a combination of early action and capital 
investment in stage two, because the research and planning investment in stage one takes 
effect in stage two, and the capital investment in stage one will still be effective in stage 
two. In the early action period, the firm minimizes the overall cost over the two periods 
by choosing early action to smooth emission reductions.  
 
2.2 Optimal Investment Rule  
Denote J  as the minimized cost. The representative firms will minimize their costs over 
the two stages with a time discount rate that is constant and equals to ρ . The 
minimization problems in stage two and stage one are 
( ) ( )222,112 , , 22 eycMinyxJ ey= ,       (2.8a) 
and  
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 ( ) ( )




++= 1121111,,1 , E 1
1,,
111
yxJeyxcMinJ
eyx ρ .    (2.8b) 
Note that in stage two, 1x  , 1y , and 1e  will be given in the sense that 1x  , 1y , and 1e  have 
been chosen in stage one and what have been chosen in stage one can not be changed in 
stage two. Whatever the initial choice will be, the remaining choices such as 2y , 2e  
should be able to minimize the sub-problem starting in the following stage. 
 
In stage two, the firm will choose investment and emissions to minimize the concurrent 
cost. Specifically, the firm will solve Equation (2.8a) in stage two. At an interior solution, 
unless can sell (or issue) permits, the first order condition will be 
22 2 pz =γ .          (2.9) 
Equation (2.9) states that the optimal emissions occur regardless the value of firm 
specific parameter γ , as long as the marginal behavioural abatement cost equals to the 
permit price 2p . The permit price is an exogenous variable determined by domestic 
marginal abatement cost or world permit market. Specifically, if Canada will do the 
Kyoto alone, the permit price is the domestic marginal abatement cost. Otherwise, the 
permit market will be determined in the international emission trading. As a result, the 
marginal behavioural abatement cost 2 2 zγ  will be equalized across the firms. Equation 
(2.9) determines the optimal behavioural abatement such that γ2
2
2
pz = .  
 
The first order condition of Equation (2.8a) with respect to 2y  yields 
( ) 01 222 =′− yrp .         (2.10) 
 15 
Recall that the purchase price of capital is fixed as one. This equation states that the 
market value of the extra technological abatement per unit of capital investment is the 
purchase price of capital investment. The optimal investment can be derived according to 
Equation (2.10) such that 
2
2222 2
1 

= py θ . Insert the optimal behavioural abatement and 
investment back into Equation (2.8a), yields the minimized cost for stage two: 
( )2/11212/112122222222 414 yxbppJ θαγθ −−+


 +−= .     (2.11) 
Equation (2.11) carries the optimal investment and the optimal behavioural abatement. 
The minimized cost is shown in Figure 2.1. 
0  
J  
PERMITS OF PURCHASE NO  
A  B  
C  
PRICE 
 
Figure 2. 1. Minimized Cost 
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The parabolic minimized cost curve cuts the price axis at two points; price converges 
from the left and the right to the middle (Point A) where permit price coincides with the 
equilibrium price ( )
γ
θ
θα
2
1
2
2
22
2/1
121
2/1
1212
2
+
−−= yxbp . The equilibrium price also carries the 
optimal investment and the optimal behavioural abatement; the numerator is BAU 
emission levels minus the technological abatement resulting from early action, and the 
investment and behavioural abatement in stage two are embedded in the denominator. 
Rearrange the denominator and insert the optimal investment and behavioural abatement 
back into the equilibrium price yields 222 brz =+ ; at the equilibrium (Point C), the 
marginal abatement cost is the market clearing permit price, and the permit trading does 
not occur at this point. In other words, under perfect competition assumption, this 
equilibrium price is the marginal abatement cost such that 
( )
γ
1
2 22
2
rbp −= . The permit 
price might converge to the equilibrium price from the right: from Point B to Point A. A 
permit price higher than the equilibrium price indicates that 222 brz >+ , so that the firm 
will buy permits and the price offered will be higher than the equilibrium price due to a 
higher private marginal abatement cost. If the permit price is lower than the equilibrium, 
it converges from the left: from the origin to Point A. As a result, the firm will sell 
permits and be willing to trade at a lower price assuming there is a market at which the 
firm can issue permits. 
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In stage one, the firm minimizes the cost over the two stages by choosing the concurrent 
investments as in Equation (2.8b). Given the minimized cost in stage two as in Equation 
(2.11), by the first order condition, the optimal investments of both types are 
( )
2
221
1 12 



+= ρ
α px          (2.12) 
( )
2
221
1111 122
1 



++= ρ
θθ ppy .        (2.13) 
Substitute (2.12) and (2.13) into (2.8b) yield the overall minimized abatement cost. It is 
similar to the minimized cost in stage two so that only the optimal investment rule is 
given. 
 
2.3 Uncertainty and Investment 
2.3.1 The Characteristics of Early Action Investment  
The first characteristic of investment is an ability to wait to invest. The firm can choose 
the timing of investment freely such that investment is a right rather than an obligation. A 
typical traditional approach in the global warming context (as well as in the Kyoto 
context) is the cost-benefit analysis, which based on the net present value approach. An 
underlying assumption of the net present value approach is that the investment possess a 
once or never proposition. If the firm do not choose to undertake an investment now, then 
the firm will never invest later. In the case of abatement cost, the firm’s problem is to 
minimize the net present value of abatement cost once and for all. However, in a dynamic 
setting, the firm will be able to make sequential decisions due to the waiting ability. In 
particular, in stage two, the firm’s problem will be to choose the rate of investment and 
the level of emissions in order to minimize the control cost regardless what have been 
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chosen, and in stage one, the firm’s problem is to minimize the overall cost until the end 
of Kyoto period. Hence, the abatement cost over the two periods will be optimized 
sequentially and recursively.  
 
The second characteristic is that the investment is, or at least partially, irreversible. In the 
context of environmental economics, there are two typical topics of irreversibility. First, 
pollution damage is irreversible in the sense that the GHG emissions can only be 
removed slowly and naturally. Second, investments on emission reduction projects are 
irreversible: once undertaken, the investment will be too costly to be recouped or 
transferred. This thesis will deal with the second form. Emission reduction projects will 
not yield an additional output to the society, but will produce clean air to the Kyoto. The 
firm will invest in the projects aimed at improving energy efficiencies or the ones aimed 
at developing new cleanup technologies. Once the firm invests at a higher rate, the 
investments to the projects can be accumulated very quickly up to an optimal level such 
that a bad decision might lead to overinvestment, and the cumulated investments will 
only fall back to the optimal level slowly by a time discount and depreciation.  
 
The third characteristic of investment is that future payoffs, negative or positive, is 
uncertain. In particular, the thesis will narrow down the type of uncertainty to be the 
technological uncertainty, the one that is essential for Canada to achieve its commitment, 
and the one associated with the arrival of new information on research over time. Since 
uncertain outcomes of the research process will affect future relative productivity of 
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capital investment, the uncertainty will be surrounding capital investment in order to 
keep the model in the later chapters as simple as possible.1 
 
2.3.2 The Combined Effect under Uncertainty 
Under uncertainty, the firm’s investment decisions are subject to the combined effect of 
the three characteristics. The combined effects of uncertainty and irreversibility will 
induce an option value, which is the value of retaining the choice to a later period in time. 
As literature suggests (e.g., see Saphores, 2000), Weisbrod (1964) first introduced option 
value concept and argued that, in the case of irreversible decision of choice, the 
flexibility to choose the timing of the decision, which creates an option value, should be 
included in the cost-benefit analysis. Cicchetti and Freeman (1971) and Schmalensee 
(1972) explained option value as a risk premium of risk averter, but the model failed if 
option value is negative. Arrow and Fisher (1974) and Hendry (1974) suggested that, 
regardless risk preferences, the uncertainty associated with an arrival of new information 
together with irreversible consequences of a decision would introduce an option value (or 
quasioption value). The option value is identified as the value of information that is 
conditional on whether retaining the option or not. The option value could be negative if 
the choice is not binary.  
                                                          
1 Of course, the future rewards of research and planning investment is uncertain. However, uncertainty will 
not induce delays on the research and planning investment. The firm will keep investing in knowledge 
creation (research and planning investment) because research and planning reveals more information. 
Under uncertainty, the new information will be scarce but useful for decisions making. In other words, 
there is no opportunity cost of undertaking research and planning investment today instead of later. This is 
not the case is capital investment. The uncertainty surrounding the capital investment is a reflection of 
technology uncertainty. The future relative productivity of capital investment is uncertain because the 
outcome of research and planning investment is uncertain. By waiting, the firm can gain more information 
through time. The uncertainty will thus affect the decision on capital investment. It makes sense that 
uncertainty defined in this thesis is uncertain future reward on capital investment for the sake of 
simplification. 
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The real options approach (such as Dixit and Pindyck (1994)) provides a new view to 
explain Weisbrod’s option value concept. The investment made on real asset has option-
like characteristics: ability to wait, irreversibility and uncertainty. With the joint effect of 
these characteristics, the uncertainty could be implicitly modeled into the expected payoff 
of the real asset. In particular, a rational firm will make decisions sequentially due to its 
ability to wait and irreversibility. On the one hand, the opportunity cost of emission is the 
market permit price, which creates an incentive to reduce emissions and to invest in the 
emission reduction projects. On the other hand, the firm is aware that it will be costly to 
reverse investment plans, and that information will come in time. With irreversibility, the 
technological uncertainty will create a risk that the firm may overabate if future relative 
productivity is improving, or may underabate if future relative productivity is slacking. 
The risk will lead to a suboptimal abatement level, and will create an opportunity cost of 
committing the Kyoto target. Instead, the firm might delay its investment in order to 
avoid the risk. The choice of investing now forgoes the opportunity of investing to a later 
date when the forthcoming information on the future economic condition will be valuable 
to the firm. In other words, waiting to invest may create a positive value (or option value) 
facing irreversible abatement process. Thus, the firm will reduce the target cumulative 
investment, and wait for more information that is valuable. 
 
In the context of real options approach, the optimal investment rule can be obtained by 
the contingent claim analysis, or equivalently, the dynamic programming (DP) analysis. 
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In this thesis, the DP approach will be used.2 A discount rate that is equivalent to the risk 
free rate of return is assumed. 
 
2.4 Summary 
Canada will achieve its commitment in the Kyoto protocol mainly through investments in 
the emission reductions. In a deterministic setting, the optimal early action investment 
rule can be derived by optimizing the abatement cost function. In reality, early action 
investment decisions are subject to the combined effect of investment attributes: ability to 
wait, irreversibility, and technological uncertainty. Given irreversible consequences of 
early action investment, the flexibility of decisions making will be counted as a positive 
value (i.e. option value), and the firm will postpone its investment to a more propitious 
date. 
                                                          
2 In the thesis, it is assumed that the spanning assumption holds. Generally, if can be traded in the financial 
market, the emission permits would be the spanning asset that is, in principle, perfectly correlated with the 
evolution of early action investment. The DP approach is equivalent to assuming that the spanning asset 
(e.g. emission permits) has a risk free rate of return. However, the spanning assumption might be too strong 
in reality. 
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CHAPTER 3 NUMERICAL EXAMPLES 
 
In the previous chapter, it is argued that early action investment has three characteristics: 
irreversibility, ability to wait and uncertainty. The firms’ investment decisions should be 
flexible because of the joint effects of these attributes. 
 
To show the impact of uncertainty on investment decisions, some numerical examples 
will be developed, and the value of waiting to invest (i.e. option value) will be examined 
in this chapter. In particular, two experiments of early action investments will be 
conducted under two different circumstances: under increasing risk, and under the world 
of bad news and good news. These experiments will show that waiting can avoid a 
downside risk; thus, there will be an option value of delaying early action investment. 
Section 3.1 lays out a numerical benchmark from Kennedy (2002). Section 3.2 presents a 
simulation of investments when the firm is facing an increasing risk. Section 3.3 presents 
a simulation of investments when the firm is facing two possible outcomes: the bad news 
and the good news. 
 
3.1 Numerical Benchmark 
The purpose of this calibration is to re-examine the numerical benchmark of Kennedy 
(2002). This calibration is required for the purpose of comparison between certainty case, 
and uncertainty case, which will be developed in section 3.2 and 3.3.  
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Following Kennedy (2000), the model is disaggregated into five sectors: electricity 
generation, industry, residential and agriculture, transportation, and “other”. Data on 
emissions is taken from the Analysis and Modeling Group (1999: Annex C, C-25) and 
the Energy Research Group (2000: Table 4-8). The Analysis and Modeling Group (1999) 
has projected BAU emissions in six sectors from 1990 to 2020, and has reported 
approximately every five years. First, the annual BAU emissions are derived from the 
growth rate of the Analysis and Modeling Group (1999). Then the data of BAU 
emissions from year 2002 to 2008 is added to become the calibrated data of BAU 
emissions in stage one.  
 
Kennedy (2000) has stressed that the BAU and the reduced emissions in stage two can be 
calibrated from the Energy Research Group (2000) who has estimated the least abatement 
cost with a national wide marginal abatement cost of $120 and a discount rate of 10%. 
Under this least-cost scheme, the estimated BAU emissions and the emission reductions 
in six sectors were forecasted for year 2010. Kennedy (2000) had also expanded the 
annual emission data to 5 years. A scale factor of 1.004 was chosen to ensure the 
extrapolated total equals the budget.  
 
The parameters in the model, namely ijθ  and 21α , are derived in the following ways. 
First, the capital investment in stage two is arbitrarily assumed to be the numeraire 
abatement method. This is because the parameters vary among sectors and periods. By 
assuming a numeraire, the other parameters will become some relative values. According 
to Kennedy (2000), the parameters can be calibrated according to these relationships: 
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221121 θθα == , 2221 1.1 θθ = , and 2222 −= θγ . These values imply that abatement due to 
research and planning and capital investment (in both periods) have the same marginal 
cost, that the learning effect associated with early capital investment is 10%, and that 
behavioural abatement is twice as costly as technological abatement. Second, the 
numeraire parameter 22θ  is derived by using marginal abatement cost of $120. Third, the 
result of all other parameters is based on the relationships with the numeraire parameter 
22θ .  
 
Table 3. 1--Optimal Solutions under Different Settings 
Stochastic 
Variable Deterministic (i) Increasing risk 
(ii)              (iii) 
“Bad News Principle” 
(iv)               (v) 
Random variable (d) 0 0.5 0.75 0.50 0.50 
Probability (q) -- 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.75 
Research & planning investment 7302 7302 7302 7302 7302 
Capital investment in stage one 8835 8243 7339 2209 4970 
Capital investment over two stages 20594 20002 19099 13968 16729 
Behavioural abatement costs 5880 5880 5880 5880 5880 
Emissions in period 1 4135 4142 4154 4242 4188 
Emission reductions in period 2 due to EA 433 425 412 315 374 
Emissions in period 2 2825 2833 2846 2943 2884 
Permit price 120 120 120 120 120 
Expected Compliance Cost 33776 33184 32280 27149 29910 
 
Notes: Investments and costs are given in million dollars. Emissions and abatements are reported in 
megatons. Permit price is given in dollars. 
Sources: Kenney (2002) for deterministic and author’s calculation for stochastic results. 
 
The aggregate optimal investments (including research and planning investment, and 
capital investment), behavioural abatement cost, emissions, and total abatement cost are 
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presented in column (i) of Table 3.1. Kennedy (2002) considered the co-benefit of 
emission reductions, while the thesis does not. The compliance cost is approximately 33 
billion dollars. The compliance cost minus the co-benefit will yield the same result as 
Kennedy (2002).  
 
3.2 Increasing Risk 
Increasing risk is an economic application of nonuniqueness of density function. 
According to Rothschild and Stiglitz (1970), increasing risk is an increasing variability of 
random variable, or random variable becomes riskier. In other words, increasing risk 
refers to a wider movement of the random variable, while the probability of doing so will 
not change. Since in a continuous distribution, the probability of any individual point on 
the real line is zero, the values of the density function of the random variable can be 
changed arbitrarily at a sequence of points without changing the probability distribution 
of that random variable. Technically, a sequence of steps can be taken to shift the 
probability weight from the center of the density function to the tail while keeping the 
mean, and is called a “mean preserving spread.” 
 
Uncertain payoffs of capital investment can be inferred to the choice of random variable. 
To model a technological uncertainty, let a given unit of capital investment yield 
technological abatement such that ( ) 2/1121  yεθ , where ε  is a random variable with mean 
one. The technological abatement ( ) 2/1121  yεθ  together with the random variable ε  
describes an evolution of uncertain future payoffs. Intuitively, 1y ε  is the past 
investment, 1y , rescaled to the efficiency units of the current technology 2y . The random 
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variable ε  reflects the outcome of the research process for the productivity of new 
investments relative to the productivity of the past investments. The minimization 
problem is  
( ) ( )




++= 112111,1 , E 1
1,
11
yxJyxcMinJ
yx ρ ,      (3.1) 
where ( ) ),(, 222,112 22 eycMinyxJ ey= . 
The first order condition will ensure that the optimal capital investment and behavioural 
abatement in stage two will be determined by permit price and prospective parameters 
rather than uncertainty. The expected minimized cost in stage two will be subjected to 
uncertainty such that 
( ) ( )( )2/11212/11212222222112  414, yExbppyxEJ εθαγθ −−+ +−= .   (3.2) 
 
In stage one, the firm will minimize the total cost over both stages by choosing research 
and planning investment  1x  and capital investment 1y . The optimal  1x  and 1y  are 
found by substituting Equation (3.2) into Equation (3.1) and setting the derivative of the 
right hand side of Equation (3.1) equal to zero. The optimal capital investment will 
satisfy 
( )εθθ 2/112212/11111 21211 −− += ypEyp .      (3.3) 
It is obviously that the second term on the right, εθ 2/112212
1 −yp , is concave in random 
variable ε . As a result, the optimal capital investment 1y  will decrease under increasing 
risk. Under a mean preserving spread in risk, the reason of such decreasing is that, with 
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ε  uncertain, the expected marginal technological abatement of capital investment 
(equivalent to MPK) will change less than ( )εθ Eyp 2/112212
1 − .3 Thus, the firm will 
undertake less capital investment 1y  and increase its expected marginal technological 
abatement of capital investment, in order to drive back to the fixed relationship in 
Equation (3.3). 
 
The numerical example is conducted in two steps: first step is changing the probability of 
random variable while keeping the mean constant; second step is changing the movement 
of the random variable in order to shift the probability weight. The parameters ijθ , 21α  
and γ  remain fixed at the benchmark levels because the parameters are derived from the 
least-cost scheme. They indicate the fact that learning effect exists in stage two, and that 
behavioural abatement is more costly than technological abatement.  
 
Suppose the random variable ε  increases to 1+d with probability 0.5, the future payoff 
will increase to 2/11212
1 Yθ , where 11 )1( ydY += . Suppose ε  fall to 1-d with probability 
0.5, and the future payoff will decrease to 2/11212
1 Yθ , where 11 )1( ydY −= . The mean of 
ε  will remain fixed at the initial level. By solving the minimization problem of Equation 
(3.1), the optimal capital investment will be:  
( ) ( )
2
221
1111 15.015.0122
1 


 −++++= dd
ppy ρ
θθ      (3.4) 
                                                          
3 This argument utilizes Jensen's Inequality. 
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The numerical results of this experiment are presented in column (ii) and (iii) of Table 
3.1. Column (ii) shows the results when d=0.50. When the second step is pursued, the 
value of d changes to 0.75 and the numerical results are given in column (iii).4 As 
expected, the capital investment in stage one decreases with mean preserving spread: the 
firm will delay capital investment 1y  under increasing risk. Another interesting result is 
that the minimized compliance cost decreases under increasing risk. Column (ii) and (iii) 
show that, if all combinations are equally likely, the higher the level of uncertainty, the 
lower the level of early action investment and the minimized cost. The lower minimized 
cost comes entirely from option value that occurred by delaying investment (waiting to 
invest) and adopting flexible investment schedules. Similar to Weibrod’s definition, this 
flexibility can be counted as an option value in the sense that it will force the firm to 
avoid the downside risk caused by uncertainty and, thus, induce the minimized cost 
lower. 
 
3.3 The “Bad News Principle” 
The size of uncertainty may vary, and random variable may move asymmetrically. The 
outcome of research investment on emission reductions may be a “good news” (an 
upward movement) or a “bad news” (a downward movement). If bad news happens, the 
firm will regret of what it has invested in research, and the investment will not yield as 
much abatement as expected; the good news is otherwise.  
 
                                                          
4 Wider movement of d, or, "riskier". 
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Technically, the bad news can be conceived as not delaying the capital investment such 
that 11 yY =  with probability q, and the good news is 01 =Y  with probability 1-q, where 
the fraction d ranges between 0 and 1. The firm’s problem is to minimize the expected 
cost in Equation (3.1). The expected minimized cost in stage two is  
( ) ( )2/11212/11212222222112 414, YqxbppyxEJ θαγθ −−+ +−= .   (3.5) 
Substituting Equation (3.5) into Equation (3.1), and taking the first order condition, it 
yields the optimal investment  
( )
2
221
1111 122
1 



++= ρ
θθ pqpy .        (3.6) 
The optimal capital investment 1y  will not depend on 1-q nor d, but on q and other 
exogenous parameters. The result restates Bernanke’s “Bad News Principle”: the decision 
of whether to invest in stage one does not depend on how good the good news might be 
(optimal investment 1y  is independent of the probability of good news, 1-q), but on how 
bad the bad news might be (optimal investment 1y  depends on q).  
 
A numerical example is given by letting d=0.50, q=0.50 and q=0.75. The value of the 
parameters, ijθ , 21α  and γ , is the same as what they are in the numerical benchmark. The 
calibrated results are reported in column (iv) and (v) of Table 3.1. As expected, if the bad 
news is not too bad, the firm tends to hold up the capital investment. As the probability of 
bad news increases, the firm tends to increase the capital investment in stage one. In other 
words, the more likely to receive a bad news, the less incentive the firm has to postpone 
its investment. This result indicates that the option value (or the value of waiting) is the 
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result of avoiding the downside risk in the sense that the firm will delay the timing of 
capital investment in order to avoid the occurrence of the bad news. 
 
3.4 Summary 
In a stochastic setting, some numerical examples are developed under increasing risk, and 
in a world of good news and bad news. Both experiments show that the firm tends to 
delay the capital investment in stage one in order to gain more information that is 
propitious. Since delaying investment will reduce a downside risk, holding up the capital 
investment the firm will gain an option value, which is the value of information that can 
be revealed with research and planning, and this will reduce the minimized abatement 
cost.  
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CHAPTER 4 A CONTINUOUS-TIME MODEL 
 
The previous chapters suggest that facing technological uncertainty the firm shall delay 
early action investment that has option-like characteristics. There are some theoretical 
and numerical limitations, however, of the model in the previous two chapters. First, the 
two-period model is too simple to gain insights on investment decisions constantly 
revised over time. Second, the movement and the probability of the random variable (d) 
can only be chosen arbitrarily such that the random payoffs do not evolve continuously 
over time and, thus, the model fails to address investment decisions under the ongoing 
uncertainty. 
 
A more general model will be presented in this chapter under the framework of Dixit and 
Pindyck (1994).5 They have developed a general investment decision rule in a stochastic 
dynamic setting and concluded that when future economic conditions are uncertain and 
investment is irreversible, facing a downside risk, firms should not invest until more 
information is revealed.  
 
The goal of this chapter is to determine the optima path of investment and its timing, and 
to address: 
• How a firm should manage the technological uncertainty when delaying 
investment on emission reduction is possible. 
                                                          
5 In most of the real options literature, uncertainty is captured implicitly by a Brownian motion because it is 
then relatively simple to derive an optimal investment and a value of waiting. In this thesis, the stochastic 
process in Equation (4.1) is custom-built according with the technological uncertainty. 
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• What the target investment level (optimal investment) should be, and when 
the firm should invest. 
 
4.1 Continuous Model 
4.1.1 Technological uncertainty 
Capital investment will follow a continuous-time stochastic process. Uncertainty will 
occur in every step of emission reduction research and project: initiation, processing, and 
completion. The rational firm will observe the realization of existing productivity and 
choose an investment level, which will transform into capital in the future. Let Y be the 
cumulative capital stock depreciating at a rate of δ , and y be an instantaneous capital 
investment. The evolution of the capital stock is modelled to take the form 
( ) dWdtYydY υδ +−=  ,        (4.1) 
dtdW ε=  where . 
The term dW  is the increment of a standard Wiener process with ε  , a normally 
distributed random variable with a mean of zero and a variance of 2σ . The depreciation 
rate δ  and the positive parameter υ  are exogenous. 
 
The first term on the right hand side of Equation (4.1) is the expected rate of investment. 
In the deterministic case, the increment of cumulative capital investment is the net capital 
investment. The second term is a random component. The parameter υ  parameterizes the 
risks with respect to uncertain outcomes of research and planning: the greater the value of 
the parameter, the higher the level of the technological uncertainty that will result in 
higher penalties or gains. There will not be any uncertainty if 0=υ . The Wiener process 
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( )tW  has standard characteristics as follows: it is a Markov process, it has independent 
increments, and the change in the process is normally distributed over finite time interval. 
The variance 2σ  provides a measure of spread, or dispersion, caused by favourable or 
unfavourable exogenous shocks; a positive ε  implies a favourable shock while a 
negative ε  indicates an unfavourable one. For simplicity, I will assume that the variance 
is as small as one because a rational firm will be continuously responding to shocks by 
revising its investment schedules, thus, will be unlikely to suffer from a big shock 
resultant a large 2σ .  
 
The randomness of dW  is entirely from the ongoing uncertainty. The increment of 
cumulative capital stock changes even if the new investment does not, which suggests 
that an ongoing technological uncertainty will change the effective level of cumulative 
capital stock regardless of what the firm does. The strong Markov property of the Wiener 
process ( )tW  will demonstrates this condition. A continuous-time Markov process 
possesses the strong Markov property in the sense that the probability distribution of the 
stochastic process depends on its current value only. In the case of research and planning, 
a past research discovery on emission reductions incorporates into current knowledge 
accumulation quickly, and future knowledge accumulation will be determined by current 
research discovery and knowledge accumulation only. Since research on emission 
reductions will resolve uncertainty, the capital investment schedules will depends on the 
pace and the amount of knowledge accumulation on emission reductions, and the 
evolution of knowledge accumulation will lead to stochastic process of capital 
investment. 
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4.1.2 The Abatement Function and the Cost Function 
The technological abatement and the cost function correspond to the two- period model 
in Chapter 2. Instantaneous technological abatement corresponding to Equation (2.1) and 
Equation (2.2) becomes 
2/1
2
2/1
1 Yyr θθ += ,         (4.2) 
where 2 ,1 and 0 =≥ iiθ . 
 
The technological abatement in Equation (4.2) is slightly different from the one in 
Chapter 2. In this chapter, it is assumed that the time path of research and planning 
investment is fixed, perhaps at its optimal level. The research and planning investments 
are made for the purpose of knowledge creation. For a single representative firm, the 
knowledge accumulation will not likely appreciate or depreciate without the flow of new 
investment. As a result, there will be no value of waiting for investing in research and 
planning, and only by investing the firm can reveal propitious information. Kennedy 
(2002) has stressed that research and planning investment is less costly than capital 
investment as it reveals the viability of the prospective technological improvement. Thus, 
the firm will invest in the knowledge creation at a maximum rate until the cumulative 
research and planning investment reaches an optimal level. There is also the likelihood 
that research and planning reflects activity beyond the control of the firm, which is 
exogenous to the investment decision. Therefore, it makes sense to assume the 
cumulative research and planning investment fixed.  
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The behavioural abatement is not included in the continuous-time model because the 
model will focus more on investment issues. Another reason is that the expected 
behavioural abatement is determined by equating the expected marginal abatement cost 
to the permit price, thus, the expected behavioural abatement will not change under 
technological uncertainty. The numerical examples in the previous chapters show that the 
firm tends to change the level of investment and the actual emissions in response to the 
uncertainty.  
 
Recall that b is the BAU emission levels. The difference between BAU emissions and 
abatement will be an emission permit, for which the firm has to pay. The total abatement 
cost corresponding to Equation (2.3) and (2.4) is 
( )rbpyC −+= .         (4.3) 
This equation implies that the total abatement cost is the sum of investment and actual 
emission payments beyond the Kyoto target. Substituting Equation (4.2) into (4.3) yields 
per-period total abatement cost function, corresponding to Equation (2.6) and (2.7),  
( )2/122/11 YybpyC θθ −−+= .       (4.4) 
 
4.2 The Mechanism of Dynamic Programming 
In the context of DP, the subsequent decisions should proceed optimally for the sub-
problem starting at the next instant regardless the current decisions. A rational firm will 
choose an optimal path of investment that will be independent of time (time invariant) 
and will minimize the abatement cost. 
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The dynamic adjustment around the equilibrium can be explained with DP. The 
assumption that the firm has a perfect foresight or rational expectations is crucial since it 
will ensure that an optimal investment decision will take into account a change of the 
state of the world. In a deterministic setting, current investments will affect future 
abatement cost through capital stock accumulation, which will entail an extra shadow 
value. In a stochastic case, both current investment and uncertainty will induce an extra 
shadow value on the future cost. The optimal investment rule will satisfy the condition 
that the value of marginal unit of cumulative capital stock equal to the cost saving. In 
particular, the influence of uncertainty and irreversibility require the cost saving to 
include the option value of waiting for more information, rather than irreversibly invest 
in the unit.  
 
The spirit of DP approach is the Bellman equation. Denote J as a collection of minimized 
costs. Recall that C is the cost that accrues all at once. Let a prime denote investment at 
the next instant. The Bellman Principle of Optimality at time interval t∆  is given as 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )[ ]{ }
, where
,,1, 1
YYY
yYYJttyYCMinYJ
y
∆+=′
′Ε∆++∆= −ρ
 
and ρ  is a discount rate. The equation says that the remaining investment choice y′  is 
subsumed in the minimized cost ( )YJ ′  grounded in the current information, thus only y  
remains to be chosen optimally. Why does the firm optimize its expected cost under 
uncertainty? In the deterministic case, the expectation symbol can be simply eliminated. 
In the stochastic setting, under the rational expectations assumption, the firm is aware of 
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the underlying stochastic process of Y , and the expectation of the future minimized cost 
( )YJ ′  will be equal to the unknown true value of the minimized cost.  
 
As shown in Appendix A.1, the continuous-time Bellman equation can be rewritten as  
( ) ( ) ( ){ }dJdtyYCMinYJ
y
Ε+= 1,ρ .       (4.5) 
The discounted abatement cost is the sum of a minimum per period cost and the direct 
effect of the change in time of expected minimum abatement cost. The structure of the 
last term on the right of Equation (4.5), ( )dJdtΕ1 , can be presented clearly by applying 
Ito’s lemma on  such that 
( ) dtJYydtdJ Y δ−=         (4.6) 
( ) YYY JdtJYyEdJdt 22
1 1 υδ +−= .       (4.7) 
Equation (4.6) and (4.7) describe as a direct effect of the change in time on the expected 
minimum cost in the deterministic setting and the stochastic setting, respectively. 
Substituting Equation (4.6) or Equation (4.7) into Equation (4.5) yields the explicit form 
of the Bellman equation in the deterministic setting, 
( ) ( ) ( ){ }Yy JYyyYCMinYJ  , δρ −+= ,       (4.8) 
and Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) in the stochastic setting, 
( ) ( ) ( ) 


 +−+= YYYYy JJYyyYCMinYJ
2
2
1 , υδρ .     (4.9) 
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4.3 Deterministic Case 
This section restricts the problem in the deterministic setting in order to narrow down the 
discussion of the effect of uncertainty. In the deterministic case, the firm is risk neutral 
and has perfect foresight. The firm will make decisions based on intrinsic logic rather 
than relying on ad hoc assumptions, or rules of thumb, and will exhibit optimization 
behaviour. The firm’s problem is to discover an optimal investment rule to minimize the 
total abatement cost over Kyoto periods 
 
The minimized abatement cost under deterministic setting, J~ , is denoted differently than 
the one under stochastic case. The firm’s problem is to solve the Bellman equation (4.8), 
which is a combination of the dynamic framework and the static sub-problem. A dynamic 
movement of the system is introduced by the shadow price of cumulative capital stock 
YJ
~  over time. A direct effect of the change by time in cumulative capital stock on the 
minimized cost J~  will be ( )YJddt ~1 . The static sub-problem is solved with a first order 
condition in the same way in a common static problem. An optimal investment rule can 
be found by equating the value of marginal unit of cumulative capital stock to the cost 
saving yC . Thus, the DP combines a dynamic framework and a static optimization 
problem in order to yield an optimal path of investment. 
 
The algebra in Appendix A.2 shows the details of the optimization of the cumulative 
capital investment. The optimal investment rule must satisfy the partial differential 
equations below: 
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      (4.10) 
YyY  δ−=• .          (4.11) 
Given the initial condition ( ) 00 0 ≥= YY  and ( ) 00 0 ≥= yy , solving the differential 
Equation (4.10) and (4.11) directly will induce tedious results. Instead, a phase diagram, 
as presented in Figure 4.1, is utilized to illustrate the stability of the model and the 
characteristics of the solutions.  
 
The Equations (4.10) and (4.11) imply that the capital investment will converge to 
equilibrium and will remain there. This can be easily shown in Figure 4.1. The loci 0=•Y  
and 0=•y  divide the nonnegative orthant into four isosectors. The locus 0=•Y  is a 
straight line with a slope of δ . The locus 0=•y  consists of two lines: the horizontal axis 
and curve 
( )
( )
2
2/1
2
1
2
1
2
1

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.The two loci intersect at Point ( )∗∗ yYE ~,~~ , or the 
origin (0, 0).  
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Figure 4. 1. Phase Diagram for Capital Investment 
 
Point E~  is the long-run equilibrium. When the initial capital stock is low, the firm will 
invest at a high initial rate of investment in order to approach ∗Y~ . Or, when the initial 
capital stock is high, the firm will invest at a low rate until the capital stock depreciates to 
∗Y~ . With perfect foresight, the firm will invest at such a level that is consistent with 
0=•Y  
0=•y
0 
Y 
( )∗∗ yYE ~,~~  
y  
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imtertemporal optimization, or exists along the stable path, in order to approach the 
equilibrium E~ . Intuitively, the equilibrium, as the intersection of the two loci, represents 
a point where neither the rate of investment nor the capital stock is changing over time. 
Once the capital stock cumulated to its optimal level, the optimal investment rule solves 
the minimization problem, and the dynamics of the system has no incentive to move to 
elsewhere but to stay at the equilibrium. However, because the two loci become 
arbitrarily small near the equilibrium, it will take an infinite amount of time to reach the 
equilibrium. 
 
The conditional equilibrium (0, 0) exists under two possible conditions: first, both the 
rate of investment and the cumulative capital stock are zero, and second, the permit price 
is zero. In other words, there is no penalty to emit and the firm has no incentive to invest 
in emission reductions. The rate of investment will become zero, and the cumulative 
capital stock will eventually depreciate to zero because of the discount rate and the 
appreciation rate. 
 
4.4 Stochastic Solutions 
In the stochastic setting, uncertainty and irreversibility induce more features compared to 
those in the deterministic case. First, technological uncertainty is embedded in the 
stochastic process of Y. The optimal path of the cumulative capital stock Y is determined 
in the model, and what can be taken exogenous is the position of the unique optimal 
trajectory ( )Yy∗ . Second, the firm’s problem is to minimize the expected abatement cost 
over time, balancing the cost C , which accrues at once and the expected cost, 
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( )[ ]yYYJ ,′Ε , accrues thereafter over time. Third, the variable J  and the stochastic 
process of Y are not differentiable with respect to time because their time derivatives do 
not exist. Instead, Ito’s lemma, which is intuitively the stochastic extension of the chain 
rule, and the differential operator ( ) ( )•Eddt1  will be used to solve the minimization 
problem.  
 
A direct effect of a change in capital investment on the minimized cost is the differential 
of HJB equation with respect to Y such as 
( ) YYYYYYYY JJJYyCJ 22
1  υδδρ +−−+= .      (4.12a)  
Using Ito’s lemma, Equation (4.12a) can be rewritten as 
( )YYYY JddtJCJ Ε+−= 1 δρ        (4.12b) 
The optimal rate of investment that minimize the cost can be obtained by taking the first 
order condition of HJB equation such as 
yY CJ −= .          (4.13) 
Equation (4.13) states that the value of a marginal unit of Y is the cost saving yC . Rather 
than in the deterministic case, with uncertainty, Equation (4.13) is not differentiable with 
respect to time. Instead, the differential operator ( ) ( )•Εddt1  is used on Equation (4.13) 
such that: 
( ) ( )
( ) 

 +Ε−=
Ε−=Ε
2
2
11                 
11
dyCdyCdt
CddtJddt
yyyyy
yY
      (4.14) 
Along the stable path, the optimal rate of investment ( )Yyy ∗∗ =  can be expanded as 
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( ) ( ) 2222 11 υYY ydYydtdydt =Ε=Ε .       (4.15) 
Substitute Equation (4.13), (4.14), and (4.15) into Equation (4.12b) and rearrange, will 
yield the condition of optimal rate of investment. Thus, the optimal investment rule 
satisfies 
( ) ( ) 

 

++−

 ++−








= −− 222112/12/12
1
8
3
2
1
2
1
4
1
1 ypypypY
p
yEdy
dt Y
υθθδρδρθ
θ
(4.16) 
YydYdt  1 δ−=Ε .         (4.17) 
 
4.5 The Effect of Uncertainty  
The optimal path of capital investment is required to satisfy the differential Equations 
(4.16) and (4.17). As in the deterministic case, a phase diagram will be presented in order 
to illustrate the effect of technological uncertainty. The associated calculation is provided 
in Appendix A.2. The phase diagram is presented in Figure 4.2, along with the 0=•y  
locus for the purpose of comparison.  
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Figure 4. 2. The Effect of Technological Uncertainty 
 
The thickly drawn loci in Figure 4.2 divide the nonnegative plan ( )yY ,  into four 
isosectors with unique sign. The locus 01 =dtEdY  duplicates 0=•Y  in deterministic 
01 =EdY
dt
 
0 and 0 ==• υy  
0 Y 
0 and 01 ≠= υEdy
dt
 
( )∗∗ yYE ,  
( )∗∗ yYE ~,~~  
increases  and 01 υ=Edy
dt
 
A  
E ′  
y  
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case, and 01 =Edydt  defines two lines: the horizontal axis at 0=y , and the curve that 
satisfies ( ) ( ) 

 

++++−= −22212/112/132/1 8
3
2
1
2
1 ypyyppyY Yυθδρθδρθ . At Point 
E ( )∗∗ yY , , the long-run equilibrium, the rate of investment and the capital stock will 
remain at a steady state.  
 
The parameter υ  parameterizes the risks with respect to uncertain outcome of research 
and planning. It is somewhat similar to the random variable d in Chapter 3. A higher 
value of υ  implies more risk in research and planning, otherwise it implies less risk. One 
extreme case is when υ  approaches zero, thus, Equation (4.16) becomes exactly the same 
as Equation (4.10), and the boundary of the stochastic case and the deterministic case will 
meet. 
 
The increment of υ  can be inferred as an unanticipated permanent increase in research 
funds. Large research projects, in most of the cases, involve more uncertainty, and 
require more research funds. Suppose the firm is initially at the long run equilibrium E. 
When the government announces that more federal research fund on emission reductions 
is available for firms, υ  will increase, and this will affect the 01 =dtEdy  locus 
according to Equation (4.16). An increment in υ  means that, for a given capital stock Y, 
Edydt1  is higher than the initial level. The rate of investment will decrease immediately 
to force the dynamics of y to drop to Point A when the shock occurs. Intuitively, the force 
that pushes the dynamics of Y and y move to A is the opportunity cost of irreversible 
investing, rather than waiting. In other words, under uncertainty and irreversibility, the 
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firm will retain an option value by gaining more information. The value of waiting, or 
option value, will create an incentive for the firm to hold up the investment schedule. 
Finally, the dynamic adjustment of Y and y will move to a new long-run equilibrium at 
Point E ′ , and the optimal investment rule will stay at a lower level. Therefore, an 
exogenous increase in research fund will have a reverse effect: it will not create more 
incentive to invest, but will induce a sudden drop of the rate of investment, and will result 
in a lower optimal investment rate and lower optimal capital stock. In other words, 
increasing risk (as υ  increases) will reduce the optimal stock of capital, and the firm 
tends to wait for more information. 
 
In conclusion, the optimal capital investment and its cumulative level will be reduced due 
to the technological uncertainty. Technological uncertainty is a consequence of research 
and planning, which is embedded in the parameter υ . The results also suggest that, any 
exogenous increase in research funds will induce an immediate decrease in the rate of 
investment. This conclusion supports the validity of the numerical examples in Chapter 3, 
thus, the firm will have a strong incentive to delay capital investment until sufficient 
information is revealed.  
 
4.6 Permit Price Uncertainty 
The United States represents 32% of Annex I baseline (1990) emissions and is expected 
to be a net buyer, mostly from Russia or Ukraine. However, the U.S., the largest 
prospective buyer, had decided to withdraw from the Kyoto. Consequently, the permit 
price under Annex I country will drop dramatically due to the repudiation, and this 
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jeopardizes the stability and the existence of a tradable permit system. However, there is 
still a chance that the U.S. will re-negotiate the Kyoto because provision has been made 
in order to keep the Kyoto alive, or the U.S. will not ratify the Kyoto at all. This section 
considers the early action investment decision of Canadian firms, given the U.S. will 
persistently change its position in the Kyoto protocol for the regulatory purpose.  
 
Beyond technological uncertainty, whether the U.S. will be absent from the Kyoto is still 
uncertain, which will directly lead to permit price uncertainty. Suppose the U.S. has a 
fifty-fifty chance to ratify the Kyoto protocol, and the permit price uncertainty will not 
have a combined effect with other uncertainty. A phase diagram in Figure 4.3 illustrates 
the impact of permit price uncertainty on early action investment. Suppose before the 
first commitment period, the U.S. make a final announcement that it will not ratify the 
Kyoto at all. The permit price will consequently reduce to ( )0ˆ where  ˆ >pp . The permit 
price will not drop to zero since no one would have any reason to “sell” them for nothing. 
There is also the prospect that potential sellers, if few in number, will act more 
politically. The 01 =Edydt  locus will consequently shift to the left according to 
( ) ( ) 

 

++++−= −22212/112/122/1 8
3ˆ
2
1
2
1 ypyyppyY Yυθδρθδρθ .  (4.18) 
The new long-run equilibrium will be Eˆ ( )∗∗ yY ˆ,ˆ . Otherwise, if the U.S. will ratify the 
Kyoto, the equilibrium will stay where it is at E ( )∗∗ yY , .  
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Figure 4. 3. The Role of the U.S. in the Kyoto Protocol 
 
Under the influence of uncertainty and irreversibility, though there is fifty-fifty chance to 
move either to equilibrium Eˆ ( )∗∗ yY ˆ,ˆ  or to E ( )∗∗ yY , , the locus 01 =Edydt  will shift 
more than half way from E, and the new locus will be closer to the locus with equilibrium 
Eˆ . In fact, the firm will have rational expectations about the U.S.’s choice but rather 
hazy about when the U.S. will make a final decision. Before the U.S. makes the decision, 
y will drop to Point B, and the dynamics of Y and y will carry them to the stable path 
around the thickly drawn dashed curve. If the U.S. eventually agrees, the dynamics of Y 
0 Y 
y  
01 =EdY
dt
 
01 =Εdydt  
( )∗∗ yYE ,  
B  ( )∗∗ yYE ˆ,ˆˆ  
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and y will be pushed back to the long-run equilibrium E, and the uncertainty will only 
effect the investment decision as a temporary shock. On the other hand, if the U.S. does 
not agree, the price will drop to  pˆ , and the dynamics of Y and y will move to a new 
equilibrium at Point Eˆ  and remain there. The lower the permit price  pˆ , the lower the 
equilibrium Eˆ  will be, and the more investment will the firm want to defer. An extreme 
case is y drops to the horizontal axis in the sense that the repudiation has such large 
influence that the international tradable permit system will finally collapse and the firm 
has no incentive to invest in emission reductions at all. The fact that it is costly to reduce 
capital holdings will induce the firm to invest much lesser because the option value (the 
value of waiting) will cause the firm to invest less. Therefore, the U.S. decision will have 
a substantial impact on Canadian firms’ capital holdings in the Kyoto as the U.S. may re-
negotiate the Kyoto protocol. The firms will hold up early action investment until the 
U.S. states its position in the Kyoto protocol.  
 
4.7 Summary 
This chapter lays out the Kyoto investment rule in general. The main finding of the 
continuous-time model in this chapter supports the conclusion in Chapter 3: under 
uncertainty, firms will delay the early action investment. An evolution of capital 
investment is a direct result of uncertain outcomes of research and planning. By waiting, 
firms will gain an option value through the accumulation of propitious information. The 
results also suggest that either a large sum of Canadian federal fund, or uncertainty 
surrounding the position of the United States in the Kyoto protocol, will reduce the 
optimal early action investment. 
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CHAPTER 5 CONCLUSION  
 
This thesis is concerned with applying the real option theory to early action investment of 
the Kyoto Protocol under uncertainty. The early action investment is stylized as capital 
investment and research and planning investment. The main characteristics of these 
investments are irreversibility, ability to wait, and uncertainty of future payoffs. With 
these characteristics, the investment decisions will be highly sensitive to uncertainties 
such as technological uncertainty and price uncertainty. The main finding of the thesis is 
that firms should delay the capital investment of early action until propitious information 
is revealed. 
 
The thesis demonstrates that the Kyoto protocol is well intentioned but not wisely 
implemented. Uncertainty and irreversibility will affect the effectiveness of Kyoto as 
well as the optimal capital holding on emission reduction projects. A consequence of 
low-level optimal early action investment will be low-level optimal emission reductions, 
while Canada has to meet its commitment, which is set at a much higher level than the 
level of optimal emission reductions. This will induce a large social loss, and will create a 
heavy financial burden in the future. The role of the United States in the Kyoto protocol 
increases complication of the firms’ investment decisions. When the US’s decision is 
negative, this thesis suggests Canadian firms not to invest in emission reductions 
projects. Canada shall reduce its emissions gradually rather than setting its rigid 
commitment target. The Kyoto protocol requires many countries to meet some fixed 
targets within a short period. This is not feasible for most firms such that more 
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modification is required to the Kyoto protocol. For example, the Kyoto commitment 
period can be extended to a later date. 
 
There are many possible extensions of this thesis. An interesting future research topic 
would be a derivation of the optimal investment when a joint decision on research and 
capital investment occurs. The probability distribution of cumulative capital investment 
might depend jointly on current cumulative capital investment and knowledge 
accumulation. The problem can also be extended to deal with technological uncertainty 
with research interaction (industry specific), or, to deal with other uncertainties such as a 
permit price uncertainty. It will also be interesting to study the research and development 
process in more detail. 
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APPENDIX  
 
A.1 A Derivation of the Bellman Equation  
Denote J as the value function of the state variable X and Y. The early action and the 
Kyoto periods will last at time interval t∆  with discounted rate of ρ. The discrete-time 
Bellman equation gives 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )[ ]{ }
.  :where
,,1, 1
YYY
yYYJttyYCMinYJ
y
∆+=′
′Ε∆++∆= −ρ
     (A.1) 
The firm chooses the rate of investment over time to obtain an expected minimum cost in 
the whole time interval. The term ( ) 11 −∆+ tρ  is a discount factor for the time interval. 
Multiply the discount factor through and rearrange, it yields 
( ) ( )( ) ( ){ }JttyYCMinYtJ
y
∆Ε+∆∆+=∆ ρρ 1, .      (A.2) 
Divide both sides of Equation (A.2) by t∆ , and let t∆  approach zero, yields 
( ) ( ) ( ){ }dJdtyYCMinYJ
y
Ε+= 1,ρ .       (A.3) 
As t∆  goes to zero, the Bellman equation becomes continuous. Equation (A.3) is the 
continuous time Bellman equation, and is equivalent to Equation (A.1). 
 
Denote J~  as the minimized cost in the deterministic setting. Equation (A.3) can be 
rewritten as: 
( ) ( ) ( ){ }JddtyYCMinYJ
y
~1,~ +=ρ        (A.4) 
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A.2 An Optimal Path in the Deterministic Setting 
Differentiate both sides of Equation (4.8) with respect to Y yields 
( ) YYYYY JJYyCJ ~ ~ ~ δδρ −−+= .       (A.5) 
Notice that by Ito’s lemma, the expansion of YJd
~  will become 
( ) ( ) YYY JYyJddt ~ ~1 δ−= . 
Insert the YJd
~  expansion back to Equation (A.5) yields 
( ) YYYY JJddtCJ ~ ~1~ δρ −+= .        (A.6) 
Minimize Equation (4.8) with respect to y yields 
yY CJ −=~ .          (A.7) 
As yY CJ  and 
~
 is differentiable with respect to time, Equation (A.7) can be rewritten as 
( )
dt
dyCdtdy
dy
dC
dtdCJddt yy
y
yY −=


−=−=~1 .     (A.8) 
Combine Equation (A.6), (A.7) and (A.8) to eliminate YJ
~ , yields 
•
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The initial condition are given as ( ) 00 0 ≥= YY  and ( ) 00 0 ≥= yy . The differential 
equations YyY δ−=•  and Equation (A.9) are difficult to solve analytically. However, the 
system of capital investment can be described with phase diagram.  
 
Equation YyY δ−=• , Equation (A.9) and the initial condition can be used for 
characterizing the solution of the capital investment system in the nonnegative orthant of 
the (Y,y) plane as shown in Figure 4.1. The 0=•Y  locus is the straight line Yy  δ=  with 
slope δ . The 0=•y  locus requires that y=0, or 
( )
( )
2
2/1
2
1
2
1
2
1








−+
+
=
−pY
p
y
θδρ
θδρ
,        (A.10) 
which is decreasing and convex. There are two Points at which both 0=•Y  and 0=•y . 
First is at the origin (0, 0), and second is at the intersection of curve Yy  δ=  and the 
curve represented by Equation (A.10); hence, Point ( )∗∗ yYE ~,~~  is where 
( )
( )
2
21
2/1
2
~ 


+
++=
−
∗
δρ
θθδδρ ppY  and ∗∗ = Yy ~~ δ . The loci 0=•y  and 0=•Y  define four 
regions (isosectors) where the sign of 
•
y  and 
•
Y  are uniquely determined inside each 
region. To see this, note that 0>∂∂ • Yy  and 0>∂∂ • yY  which imply that as Y increases, 
•
y  increases, and as y increases, 
•
Y  increases. The trajectories across the loci will change 
the signs. Hence, we can define the sign of each region as shown in Figure 4.1. The 
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arrows on the curves indicate the directions of admissible trajectories in each region. The 
equilibrium point (0, 0) is conditional stable: only the trajectories that start in the south 
region, and some trajectories in the west region cross over 0=•Y  will converge to this 
point. The trajectory that start in north region and some trajectories in the east region 
cross over 0=•Y  will not converge to any equilibrium. As the trajectories cover over the 
entire space of the west and the east region, there must be one stable path will approach 
the equilibrium ( )∗∗ yYE ~,~~  because the trajectories in the west region move to southeast 
and the ones in the east region moves to the southwest.  
 
A.3 An Optimal Path in the Stochastic Setting 
With Ito’s lemma on ( )YdJΕ  and drop the terms of a higher order more than one will 
yield  
( ) ( ) dtJJYyYdJ YYY 

 +−=Ε 2
2
1 υδ .      (A.11) 
Substitute (A.11) into (A.3) yields: 
( ) ( ) ( ) 


 +−+= YYYy JJYyyYCMinYJ
2
2
1 , υδρ      (A.12) 
Differentiate both side of Equation (A.12) with respect to Y such that: 
( ) YYYYYYYY JJJYyCJ 22
1υδδρ +−−+=       (A.13) 
By using the Ito’s lemma, Equation (A.13) can be rewritten as: 
( )YYYY JEddt JCρJ 1+−= δ        (A.14) 
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The investment y will minimize the right hand side of the Equation (A.12). The first 
order condition will be 
yY CJ −= .          (A.15) 
Applying differential operator on both sides of Equation (A.15) and using Ito’s lemma to 
expand yC  yields  
( ) ( ) ( )  +Ε−=Ε−=Ε 221111 dyCdyCdtCddtJddt yyyyyyY .    (A.16) 
Notice that ( )Yyy ∗=  goes along the trajectory, thus, dy  can be expanded. Drop the 
terms with order higher than one becomes 
( ) ( ) 2222 11 υYY ydYydtdydt =Ε=Ε .       (A.17) 
Insert Equation (A.15) to (A.16) into Equation (A.14) to eliminate YJ  such that: 
( ) ( ) 22
2
11 υδρ YyyyyyYy yCEdydtCCC −−=+−  
Rearrange yields: 
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There are two lines will satisfy 01 =Edy
dt
: one is the y=0 line; and the other one is 
( ) ( ) 0
8
3
2
1
2
1 222
11
2/12/1
2 =

++−

 ++− −− ypypypY Yυθθδρδρθ .  
 
The shape of 01 =Edy
dt
 ( )0≠y  is discussed in the following way. According to 
Equation (A.18), the points on locus 01 =Edy
dt
 ( )0≠y  will satisfy  
( ) ( ) 

 

++++−= −22212/112/122/1 8
3
2
1
2
1 ypyyppyY Yυθδρθδρθ .  (A.19) 
Note that Equation (A.19) is the stochastic version of the Equation (A.10). For 
convenience, rewrite (A.10) such that: 
( ) ( ) 

 +++−= 2/112/122/1 ~2
1~
2
1~ YPypY δρθδρθ      (A.20) 
For given amount of y (or y~ ), Y is smaller than Y~ . As y goes to infinity, the limit 
222
18
3 −

 ypyYυθ  will approach zero. This indicates that as y increases, Y will be closer 
and closer to Y~ . The 01 =Εdy
dt
 and ( )0≠y  locus will be infinitely close to the 0=•y  
locus as y increases, and the 01 =Εdy
dt
 and ( )0≠y  locus will go further away from the 
locus 0=•y . Thus, the locus 01 =Εdy
dt
 and ( )0≠y  can be drawn. Another locus 
01 =ΕdY
dt
 is the same straight line as the one in the deterministic case δYy = . The 
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equilibrium ( )∗∗ yYE ,  is smaller than ( )∗∗ yYE ~,~~ . The phase diagram can therefore be 
presented in Figure 4.2. 
 
A.4 Main Data and Parameters 
Table A.1--Data and Parameters 
 
1b  2b  Least Cost γ  11θ  21θ  22θ  21α  
Electricity 688 646 257 0.89 1.50 1.50 1.65 1.50 
Industry 1471 1279 1130 2.32 0.93 0.93 1.02 0.93 
Residential and  Agriculture 295 235 191 7.89 0.50 0.50 0.55 0.50 
Transportation 1112 995 775 1.57 1.13 1.13 1.24 1.13 
Others* 784 577 472 3.27 0.78 0.78 0.86 0.78 
Total 4350 3731 2825      
 
*Others include commercial & institutional, carbon sinks of forest and agricultural. 
Source: Kennedy (2002). 
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